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Frontispiece. The Melms mansion (as seen in this undated nineteenthcentury photograph) faced south on Virginia Street in Milwaukee, slightly
more than a block west of modern-day 6th Street. Courtesy of the
Milwaukee County Historical Society.

MELMS 13AUG11.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/13/2011 11:02 PM

MELMS V. PABST BREWING CO. AND
THE DOCTRINE OF WASTE
IN AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW
THOMAS W. MERRILL

*

1

Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. may be the most important decision
2
ever rendered by an American court concerning the law of waste.
Unless your specialty is property law, that might not be enough to stir
your interest. The doctrine of waste, after all, does not loom very large
in public consciousness these days.
Nevertheless, waste has held a peculiar fascination for property
3
theorists. The reason, I think, is that it touches directly on an important
line of division in how we think about property. Does property exist
primarily to protect the subjective expectations that particular owners
have in particular things? Or is the central function of property to
maximize the value that society ascribes to particular things? To put it
somewhat dramatically, but I think not inaccurately: Is property an
individual right or a social institution?
Melms was decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1899. It
involved a mansion on the south side of Milwaukee that was demolished
in the early 1890s by Captain Frederick Pabst, the brewer of Pabst
Brewing Company fame. Pabst owned the surrounding property, and
thought he owned the mansion, too. It turned out that Pabst did not

*

Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. This is an expanded
version of Professor Merrill’s Robert F. Boden Lecture, delivered at Marquette University
Law School in September 2010. A comment by Richard A. Posner follows this article.
Versions of the article and comment (abridged but with some additional images) were
published in the Summer 2011 Marquette Lawyer. The author wishes to thank Philip C.
Babler, Andrew B. Davis, and Thomas G. Kamenick for exceptional research assistance.
1. 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899).
2. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.2
(3d ed. 2000) (citing Melms as “[t]he leading American case” on ameliorative waste and
referring to it extensively as a model for how waste disputes should be resolved by courts).
3. For a sampling of views, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 54–58 (1977); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW § 3.11 (8th ed. 2011); JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM,
COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 44–66 (2010); John A. Lovett, Doctrines of
Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209 (2007); John G. Sprankling, The
Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (1996).
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own the mansion in fee simple. Rather, according to another decision of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court—handed down four years after the
4
mansion was destroyed —he held it only for the life of an elderly widow
named Marie Melms. After Marie’s death, her children would have
inherited the mansion, if it still stood. The Melms children sued Pabst,
claiming he had committed waste by destroying the home that was
rightfully theirs.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 1899 decision rejected the claim
5
that Pabst had committed waste in leveling the mansion. The decision
contained path-breaking language seeming to say that waste disputes
should be resolved by comparing economic values. In other words, the
court appeared to adopt the view that property is a social institution, not
an individual right. My central objective here is to ask whether this is
the correct understanding of the case, or of the lessons that it holds for
property law more generally.
I.
Waste is one of the ancient writs of the common law, dating back to
6
the twelfth century. It applies when two or more persons have interests
in property, but at least one of them is not in possession. A lease is the
most familiar example; a life estate followed by a remainder would be
another. For convenience, I will generally refer to persons in possession
as “tenants,” and those out of possession as “absent owners,” with the
understanding that these terms cover a variety of situations with more
technical terminology.
Waste is an action by an absent owner to prevent the tenant from
injuring the absent owner’s interest in property. The action for waste
has always been preventive in nature. The Statute of Gloucester,
enacted in 1278, provided that the absent owner could recover treble
7
damages against the tenant for committing waste. This was obviously
designed to deter tenants from harming the interests of absent owners.
Many states today still have statutes providing for multiple damages for
8
waste. The chancellor’s court of equity, again quite early on, issued
4. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 140, 148, 66 N.W. 244, 246 (1896).
5. Melms, 104 Wis. at 15–16, 79 N.W. at 741.
6. 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.02 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2011). For an
overview of waste law, see STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 2, §§ 4.1–4.5.
7. 6 Edw. 1, c. 5 (1278) (Eng.).
8. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2919(2)(a) (West 2010) (“Any . . . life tenant
. . . who commits or suffers any waste . . . is liable for double the amount of actual damages.”);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 732 (West 1980) (“If a guardian, conservator, tenant for life or
years, joint tenant, or tenant in common of real property, commit[s] waste thereon, any
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injunctions against waste, also reflecting its preventive nature.
Waste comes in three varieties: permissive, voluntary, and
10
11
ameliorative. Permissive waste is a form of nonfeasance. Suppose
someone dies, leaving the tenant the house for life and then to the
absent owner. While the tenant is in possession, the roof develops a
leak, but the tenant does nothing to correct the situation, causing the
interior to suffer water damage. Here, the tenant’s nonfeasance has
harmed the absent owner’s interest in the house. The absent owner has
an action against the tenant for waste.
12
Voluntary waste, the second variety, is a form of misfeasance. A
simple example: the absent owner leases a farm with a cherry orchard to
the tenant. The tenant cuts down the cherry trees and sells them for
wood. Here the tenant’s misfeasance has damaged the interest of the
absent owner. The absent owner has an action for waste against the
tenant.
13
The third variety, called ameliorative waste, is the least common
but by far the most interesting. Suppose that the absent owner leases a
warehouse to the tenant for twenty years. Several years on, the tenant
wants to remodel the warehouse into a trendy restaurant. This clearly
represents a fundamental change in the property. But, the tenant
argues, with supporting evidence from real-estate appraisers, the
property would be worth much more, in market-value terms, as a
restaurant than as a warehouse. Should the absent owner be allowed to
enjoin construction of the restaurant, or recover multiple damages
against the tenant for waste, if the tenant remodels? Or should we
regard such market-value-enhancing changes as not being waste at all?
Melms is a stark example of this third variety of waste. Although the
life tenant, Pabst, demolished the mansion, the Wisconsin Supreme
14
Court held that he was not guilty of waste. The court described how
circumstances in the neighborhood had changed since the mansion was
person aggrieved by the waste may bring an action against him therefor, in which action there
may be judgment for treble damages.”).
9. See 7 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 278–79 (1926).
10. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES
603–04 (2007).
11. Id.
12. Id. Voluntary waste is also sometimes called “affirmative waste.”
13. John Henry Merryman, Waste, in 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 20.11 n.1
(A. James Casner ed., 1952) (“The various terms ‘meliorating,’ ‘ameliorating,’ ‘meliorative,’
and ‘ameliorative’ are all used to describe the same doctrine. It is not contended that one is
preferable to the others. The matter seems to be largely one of taste.”).
14. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 15–16, 79 N.W. 738, 741 (1899).
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built. The surrounding land had been graded down, leaving the mansion
15
standing on an isolated knoll.
What was once a residential
16
Because of these
neighborhood had become an industrial district.
changes, the court said, the property was largely worthless as a
17
residence.
It was worth much more, in economic terms, with the
mansion razed and the land graded down to the level of the surrounding
18
property so that it could be used for industrial purposes.
Melms proved to be a milestone in a transformation in the law of
waste that took place in the twentieth century. Before Melms, all courts
would have regarded the deliberate destruction of a house to be waste.
Indeed, any material alteration of property by someone temporarily in
19
possession was regarded as waste.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court
20
acknowledged that this was the established rule.
21
After Melms, the old rule began to break down. Initially, other
22
states followed Melms in considering changed circumstances. Later,
15. Id. at 8, 79 N.W. at 738.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Courts more commonly referred to the idea that the tenant was prohibited from
performing any act that would injure or prejudice “the inheritance.” See Merryman, supra
note 13, § 20.11 n.4 (“[A]ny alteration of the premises which is injurious to the inheritance is
waste, even though it increases the value of the land.”). Although this was less precise than
“any material alteration,” for my purposes the different possible connotations can be ignored,
since neither formulation embraced the modern, economics-focused conception of waste of
which Melms is a precursor. For other cases employing the “material alteration” standard,
see, e.g., Parkman’s Adm’r v. Aicardi & Tool, 34 Ala. 393, 395–96 (1859) (“It is an old
principle of the common law, that a tenant is guilty of waste, if he materially changes the
nature and character of the building leased.”); Turman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 317 P.2d 302,
304 (Mont. 1957) (“[A]ny material alteration or change in the nature and character of a
building on the leased premises, even though it enhances the value of the property and is
beneficial to the reversion, constitutes waste.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hayman
v. Rownd, 118 N.W. 328, 329 (Neb. 1908) (“Waste is an improper destruction or material
alteration or deterioration of the freehold . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Winship
v. Pitts, 3 Paige Ch. 259, 262 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (tenant has “no right to pull down valuable
buildings, or to make improvements or alterations which will materially and permanently
change the nature of the property, so as to render it impossible” to restore it at the end of the
term).
20. Melms, 104 Wis. at 10, 79 N.W. at 739 (citing Brock v. Dole, 66 Wis. 142, 28 N.W. 334
(1886), and Bandlow v. Thieme, 53 Wis. 57, 9 N.W. 920 (1881), as previous cases that held
that any material alteration of a property would constitute waste).
21. See infra notes 127–35 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Chapman v. Cooney, 57 A. 928, 929 (R.I. 1904) (stating that the court
should look to the “particular facts” of the case and apply the law “with reasonable regard to
the circumstances”); Hamburger & Dreyling v. Settegast, 131 S.W. 639, 640–41 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1910) (endorsing the Melms view that changed circumstances are relevant, but finding
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the traditional rule was replaced in many states by a multifactor
23
standard. The standard is expressed differently, but typically it looks
24
to factors such as what a normal owner would do with the property and
whether the tenant’s actions had increased or decreased the economic
25
value of the property. In practice, economic value tends to dominate
everything else. If the economic value goes up, this confirms what a
normal owner would do and where the neighborhood is heading. If the
value goes down, the opposite inferences are drawn.
The conventional rule of waste—that the tenant can make no
material change in the thing without the permanent owner’s
permission—is consistent with the view of property as an individual
right. The purpose of property law is to protect owned things from
interference by others, whether by trespass or nuisance, fraud or theft.
Property promotes autonomy, security, the ability to make long-term
plans, the right to be different. If I temporarily transfer possession of
some thing to someone else, through a lease or a life estate, I am
entitled to receive the same thing back. This protects my subjective
expectations about the thing—my plans for its use in the future—
without regard to whether these expectations or plans make sense from
anyone else’s perspective.
The newer view of waste, reflected in the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s decision in Melms, is consistent with the view of property as a
social institution. Temporary transfers of possession create a potential
conflict of interest between the tenant and the absent owner. Such
conflicts should not be resolved by insisting that the views and
aspirations of the absent owner always prevail. We should instead ask
whose views are more congruent with the interests of society. The
answer will depend on the circumstances of each case. What we need is

no changed circumstances presented).
23. See Merryman, supra note 13, § 20.11. For more-recent examples, see Sprucewood
Inv. Corp. v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 33 P.3d 1156, 1165 (Alaska 2001) (“Waste occurs when
the owner of a possessory estate engages in unreasonable conduct that results in physical
damage to the [property] and substantial diminution in the value of estates owned by others
in the same [property].”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 146 A.2d
458, 463 (N.J. 1958) (“The element of increased value can be but one of the many factors,
having its greatest influence in long-term arrangements.”).
24. See, e.g., Wingard v. Lee, 336 S.E.2d 498, 500 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (listing, among
other factors to be considered, “whether the use is reasonable in the circumstances”).
25. See, e.g., Zywiczynski v. Zywiczynski, 80 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947)
(stating that the tenant may not do “those things which are not necessary to the full
enjoyment of the particular estate, and which have the effect permanently to diminish the
value of the future estate”).
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a flexible standard that allows courts to take into account a variety of
factors, including, perhaps most importantly, economic value, in order
to resolve these disputes in the way that is best for society.
The same fundamental question—whether property is an individual
right or social institution—arises throughout property law. Consider the
law of nuisance. When property is threatened by pollution, are owners
presumptively entitled to an injunction, allowing them to insist on
shutting the polluting factory down? Or must they be content with an
award of damages, leaving it up to the factory to decide whether to stop
polluting or to pollute and pay—whichever creates the greatest wealth
26
for society? Similarly, consider the law of eminent domain. Should the
government be allowed to condemn property in return for payment of
just compensation only in situations of strict necessity? Or can the
government use eminent domain for any project that promises to make
the social pie larger, generating more jobs and tax revenue than the
compensation that the government must pay to the owners whose
27
property is taken?
Ameliorative waste, the issue in Melms, presents the same
fundamental question, yet in a simple context, typically involving only
two parties. We can regard it as a bellwether for assessing our
understanding of the basic purposes of property law.
II.
It is time to take a closer look at Melms. The roots of the dispute lie
in the untimely death of Charles T. Melms, generally known as “C. T.”
In 1843 at the age of 24, Melms immigrated to the United States from
28
Prussia and settled in Milwaukee. He married into a brewing family,
29
becoming a partner with his father-in-law, Franz Neukirch. Around
1854, Melms and Neukirch purchased land along Virginia Street, in the
Menomonee Valley (so named after the local river) on the near south
side of Milwaukee. There they developed a state-of-the-art brewery
30
complex, called the Menomonee Brewery. By 1860, it was one of the
26. The classic case is Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). See
generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
27. This, of course, is the debate raised by Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005).
28. Naturalization record of Charles T. Melms in the Milwaukee County Historical
Society.
29. H. RUSSELL AUSTIN, THE MILWAUKEE STORY: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN
CITY 81 (1946).
30. H. Russell Zimmermann, South Side Building Recalls Those Early Brewing Days,
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31

largest breweries in Milwaukee.
In 1864, Melms constructed a
32
handsome Italianate mansion on the site. The house was placed high
atop a terraced and landscaped garden overlooking Virginia Street. The
terrace extended well to the west of the house, where Melms placed a
33
beer garden with a fountain and gazebo (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Melms mansion and beer garden, pre-1876, viewed from the
southwest. Courtesy of the Wisconsin Historical Society. WHi-53917.

MILWAUKEE J., Sept. 10, 1978, at 1. For a slightly different account, see LOUIS F. FRANK,
GERMAN-AMERICAN PIONEERS IN WISCONSIN AND MICHIGAN: THE FRANK-KERLER
LETTERS, 1849–1864, at 326 n.6 (Harry H. Anderson ed., Margaret Wolff trans., 1971)
(“Melms’s brewery had passed through several hands before he acquired it in 1848. It was
first established in 1841 by Simon Reutelshofer, who is generally regarded as the first to brew
German-style lager beer in Milwaukee.”).
31. THOMAS C. COCHRAN, THE PABST BREWING COMPANY: THE HISTORY OF AN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 54 (1948) (citing the Wisconsin Census of 1860). Melms’s brewery is
listed as the largest in terms of production in barrels. This number may be in error, as it was
almost twice the production of the next largest brewery and the other comparison statistics do
not support this disparity. Melms’s brewery had the second-largest number of employees
(ten), the second-largest average monthly pay roll ($250), and the fifth-highest value of
products ($30,000). Id.
32. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 7–8, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899).
33. Transcript of Record at 24 (testimony), Melms, 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738. The cited
document is a printed filing in the Wisconsin Supreme Court titled “Case”: it contains
excerpts from the pleadings, testimony, exhibits, and findings in the lower court and is
available, together with the briefs, in bound volumes titled Wisconsin Reports: Cases and
Briefs, today found in the Eckstein Law Library at Marquette University. As the name
suggests, the organization of these volumes corresponds to the official decisions in the
Wisconsin Reports.
Figure 1 above shows the Melms mansion (on the right) and the beer garden and gazebo
(on the left). The frontispiece to this article also shows the mansion. Figure 2 (on the next
page) shows the site of the mansion on a late-nineteenth-century map of Milwaukee.
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Figure 2. This section of an 1888 map places the Melms mansion in the larger
context of Milwaukee. Courtesy of the American Geographical Society
Library, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee Libraries.
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In 1869, Melms sat on a needle, and (in that era before antibiotics)
34
developed an infection and then lockjaw. As he lingered before dying,
Melms executed a will leaving all his real and personal property to his
35
wife, Marie, and urging her to carry on the family business. Marie and
36
two of C. T.’s brothers were named executors.

Figure 3. C. T. Melms. Courtesy of the Milwaukee County Historical Society.

C. T. Melms’s death at the age of 50 left his young widow, who spoke
37
mostly German, with seven minor children to raise. Marie wanted to
keep the business going but quickly concluded it was impossible. The
34. AUSTIN, supra note 29, at 82.
35. Melms v. Pfister, 59 Wis. 186, 187–88, 18 N.W. 255, 256 (1884).
36. Id.
37. Brief for Appellants at 1 and Supplemental Transcript of Record at 434
(Memorandum of Opinion), Melms, 93 Wis. 153, 66 N.W. 518. For a description and location
of these materials, see supra note 33.
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estate had debts far in excess of the value of its assets. On legal advice,
Marie decided to exercise her right to renounce the will, and instead to
39
take homestead and dower rights in the property. The homestead
rights consisted of a life estate in the mansion and a quarter acre of land
surrounding it. The dower rights consisted of a one-third life estate in
all other real property that her husband had owned, including the
40
These marital property rights were subject to
brewery complex.
41
existing mortgages, but not to claims of unsecured creditors. Because
Marie renounced the will, the balance of C. T.’s property passed by
intestate succession to his children.
After Marie renounced the will and took homestead and dower
rights, the executors petitioned the probate court for permission to sell
the remaining assets of the estate. The court granted this request, in the
42
form of a License for Executors’ Sale issued on January 5, 1870. The
assets were sold in multiple transactions. The property on which the
mansion and the brewery stood, minus Marie’s homestead and dower
rights and subject to existing mortgages, was sold to Jacob Frey, Marie’s
43
brother-in-law, for $379.50. The purpose of this transaction, almost
certainly, was to strip away the claims of as many unsecured creditors as
44
If the unsecured creditors failed to object before the
possible.
transaction was completed, there would be nothing but $379.50 left in
the estate to pay them.
Once the sale to Frey closed, Frey and Marie entered into a joint
contract to sell all their interests in the Virginia Street property to
Frederick Pabst and Emil Schandein, who were then doing business as

38. Brief for Appellants, supra note 37, at 1–2.
39. Melms, 59 Wis. at 186, 18 N.W. at 255; Supplemental Transcript of Record, supra
note 37, at 434 (Memorandum of Opinion).
40. Melms, 93 Wis. at 153–55, 66 N.W. at 518–20; Supplemental Transcript of Record,
supra note 37, at 252–54, 361 (exhibits); see WIS. STAT. ch. 89, § 1 (1871) (stating that a widow
is “entitled to a dower, or use during her natural life, of one-third part of all the lands” of her
husband).
41. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 140, 147–48, 66 N.W. 244, 246 (1896) (“[I]f
[Marie Melms] took under the law, she took a life estate in the homestead, subject to
mortgages . . . and she could take free of claims for unsecured debts her dower estate in the
remaining real estate.”). This conclusion presumably refers at least in part to WIS. STAT. ch.
94, § 1 (1871) (“When the personal estate . . . shall be insufficient to pay all [the deceased’s]
debts . . . , his executor or administrators may mortgage, lease, or sell his real estate (except
the homestead) for that purpose . . . .”).
42. Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 79–80 (license); see also Supplemental
Transcript of Record, supra note 37, at 414 (Memorandum of Opinion).
43. Melms, 93 Wis. at 153–55, 66 N.W. at 518–20.
44. COCHRAN, supra note 31, at 60.
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45

the Phillip Best Brewing Company. Marie sold her homestead and
dower rights, and Frey sold everything that he had purchased from the
estate. The sale to Pabst was for $95,000, minus assumption of
mortgages, netting $40,000 for Marie, which was paid to her over time
46
pursuant to a purchase-money mortgage. Marie moved into humbler
quarters, and used the money from the sale of the homestead and dower
47
rights to support and educate her large brood of children. Schandein
48
and his family moved into the Melms mansion.

Figure 4. Frederick Pabst. Courtesy of the Wisconsin Historical Society. WHi-60078.

45. Melms, 93 Wis. at 153–55, 66 N.W. at 518–20.
46. Id. at 159–60, 66 N.W. at 519.
47. Marie lived in Milwaukee until 1879, when she moved to Massachusetts for a year
and lived with her son, Gustav Melms. She thereupon lived a year in Chicago, five years
abroad, another decade and a half or so in Milwaukee again, and, finally, her last year in
Germany, the region from which she had emigrated to the United States ca. 1840. See
Supplemental Transcript of Record, supra note 37, at 76 (testimony); infra note 72 (and
source cited).
48. Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 21–22 (testimony).
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The next almost twenty years, Pabst and Schandein operated the
Melms brewery as the South Side Brewery of the Phillip Best Brewing
49
Company, later to be known as the Pabst Brewing Company. The
company made many improvements during this time, including building
a bottling house (which still stands), an elevator, coal sheds, icehouses,
50
and railroad sidings.

Figure 5. Phillip Best Brewing Co.’s “South Side Brewery” along the
Menomonee Canal, ca. 1880 (old Melms brewery in the background).
Courtesy of the Wisconsin Historical Society. WHi-54326.

After the Melms children grew to be adults, some of them became
51
It
convinced that they had been cheated out of their inheritance.
seems they were unaware, at least initially, that their father’s estate had
been insolvent, or that their mother and their uncles had contrived to
defraud many of the creditors of the estate. No doubt the transactions
49. COCHRAN, supra note 31, at 61.
50. Melms, 93 Wis. at 162, 66 N.W. at 520.
51. See id. (noting that the children sued claiming that the transactions deprived them of
their inheritance and were fraudulent).
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of 1870 and 1871, which had the effect of removing the Melms family
from the mansion their father had built and putting them in muchreduced circumstances, had not been characterized this way around the
family dinner table.
In 1882, the children retained a lawyer and sued to set aside one of
the sales of property by the estate, some six-and-one-half acres to the
west of the brewery, described as lying in the “Menomonee Marsh,”
52
which had been purchased by Guido Pfister. The lawsuit advanced a
number of technical grounds for invalidating the sale: for example, that
the probate court had required notice of the sale in the “Milwaukee
Sentinel,” but the notice had instead been published in the “Milwaukee
53
Daily Sentinel.” The most important claim was that an independent
guardian should have been appointed to protect the rights of the Melms
54
children.
This and all the other claims were rejected with little
55
difficulty by both the circuit court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In 1886, Pabst and Schandein decided to consolidate their operations
in an enlarged north side brewery, called the Empire Brewery. They
closed the South Side Brewery and all its associated operations on
56
Virginia Street. Schandein moved out of the mansion and died in 1888.
The bottling house, which was relatively new, was converted into a
57
machine shop for the Norberg Manufacturing Company. In 1891–1892,
Pabst razed the mansion and graded the terraces on which it had stood,
58
down to the level of the surrounding property. His apparent objective
was to prepare the property for sale or lease as an industrial site, the
judgment being that it would obtain a higher price if uniformly graded
59
and without the mansion. The site was eventually sold to the Pfister &
Vogel Leather Company.
About the same time Pabst was tearing down the mansion, the
Melms children learned from an uncle that the sale of property by the
estate to Frey in 1870 was vulnerable because their mother—one of the
executors—was a secret beneficiary of this transaction. After further
52. Melms v. Pfister, 59 Wis. 186, 18 N.W. 255 (1884).
53. Id. at 189, 18 N.W. at 257.
54. Id. at 190–91, 18 N.W. at 257.
55. Id. at 186–97, 18 N.W. at 255–60.
56. Brief for Appellants at 10, Melms, 104 Wis. 7, 78 N.W. 738; see supra note 33
(explaining where this document may be found).
57. See Rascher’s Fire Insurance Atlas of the City of Milwaukee 145–46 (1888).
58. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 8, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899); see also Brief for
Appellants, supra note 56, at 10–11.
59. Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 54–55 (testimony).
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legal consultations, they decided to try their luck at litigation again.
This time they sued their mother, as well as Pabst, claiming that the
transaction from the estate to Frey was void, and hence Pabst had no
60
valid title to the property. They also claimed that the only interest
Pabst had acquired in the homestead was their mother’s life estate, and
that the remainder after her death (she was still alive at the time)
61
belonged to them.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed these claims in separate
opinions in 1896. The claim that the sale to Frey was void for fraud was
62
assigned to Justice Silas Pinney. He concluded that the sale was merely
voidable, not void, and that Pabst was a bona fide purchaser for value
63
without notice of any fraud, and hence had good title. Moreover, the
children had waited too long to sue, and the action was barred by
64
laches.
65
Justice John Winslow was assigned to deal with the homestead.
The critical issue was whether the children’s remainders were included
in the rights sold by the estate to Frey in 1870. If the remainders were
sold to Frey, then Frey had sold them to Pabst. If the remainders were
not sold by the estate, they still belonged to the children.
The key document was the deed from the executors to Frey,
executed on May 25, 1870, which was ambiguous on this point. It sold
the entire parcel of land on Virginia Street, together with “brewery,
buildings & improvements thereon,” “excepting . . . that portion, which
66
has been set apart as a homestead to the widow of the said deceased.”
It then proceeded to set forth a metes-and-bounds description of the
quarter acre of land set apart as the homestead, concluding with the
qualification that the described quarter acre was “subject to four

60. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 153, 155−56, 66 N.W. 518, 518 (1896).
61. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 140, 143, 66 N.W. 244, 245 (1896).
62. Melms, 93 Wis. 153, 66 N.W. 518.
63. Id. at 165−70, 66 N.W. at 521−23.
64. Id. at 170−75, 66 N.W. at 523−25.
65. Melms, 93 Wis. 140, 66 N.W. 244.
66. Deed from Executors of Charles T. Melms to Jacob Frey, May 25, 1870, recorded in
Milwaukee County Courthouse, May 31, 1870, vol. 115, p. 600. The License for Executors’
Sale, dated January 5, 1870, authorizing the estate to sell all of the Virginia Street property,
used similar language. It excepted from the authorization of sale “that portion which has
been set apart as a homestead to the widow of the said deceased.” Transcript of Record,
supra note 33, at 80; accord id. at 80–81 (order dated May 25, 1870, confirming executors’
sale).
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mortgages on the whole property, including said homestead and to the
67
right of dower, as herein above mentioned.”
This can be interpreted in two different ways. By excepting “that
portion” set aside for the homestead, did the deed except from the sale
only Marie’s legal homestead rights, i.e., her life estate? Or did it except
from sale both her life estate and the children’s remainders? If only the
life estate was excepted, then the remainders were included in the
property sold to Frey. If both the life estate and the remainders were
excepted, then the remainders were not sold to Frey and instead
descended to the children. The last quoted sentence is also unclear in its
import. It seems to say that the quarter acre set aside as the homestead
is subject to four mortgages and to Marie’s dower rights. Significantly, it
does not say the described land is subject to Marie’s homestead rights—
this would have clearly signaled that a fee simple in the quarter acre was
excepted from sale. Rather, it says that the quarter acre is subject to
four mortgages that apply to the whole property “including” the
homestead (and is subject to the dower right). This carried forward the
ambiguity about whether “the homestead” referred only to Marie’s life
68
interest, or to her life interest plus the remainders.
For reasons that are unclear, Pabst’s lawyers never focused on the
language of the deed from the estate to Frey, either in the trial court or
on appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Perhaps the trial court’s
finding that the sale to Frey was a “mere sham,” and that Frey took the
69
property upon “a secret trust” to hold it for Marie, discouraged the
lawyers from using the deed to establish a chain of title running from the
children to Pabst. But the fact that Marie and Frey conspired to defraud
third parties should have had no bearing on the validity of the chain of
transactions as among the estate, Frey, and Pabst and Schandein—none
of whom was found to have committed fraud on the other. In any event,
Pabst’s lawyers made no attempt to establish a chain of title, relying
instead on other arguments in favor of holding that Pabst had acquired
67. Deed from Executors of Charles T. Melms, supra note 66.
68. It is of course rather odd that if only a life estate were excepted, the deed would also
make special note of the fact that the dower rights were excepted. The dower rights were also
a life estate, see WIS. STAT. ch. 89, § 1 (1871) (stating that a widow is “entitled to a dower, or
use during her natural life, of one-third part of all the lands” of her husband), so the deed
would be excepting a life estate in a life estate. But the dower rights were a life estate in a
thirty-three percent interest in all the land of which the husband died seized, whereas the
homestead was a full life estate in only the family home and one-quarter acre of land. I would
attribute any overlap to lawyerly caution in wanting to cover all the bases.
69. See Melms, 93 Wis. at 142, 66 N.W. at 246; Supplemental Transcript of Record, supra
note 37, at 416 (Memorandum of Opinion).
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the remainders, which Justice Winslow had no difficulty resolving in
70
favor of the children. The result was that Pabst was found to have
acquired only a life estate pur autre vie in the homestead property,
71
which would expire upon the death of Marie. (She would die in late
72
1899. )
The conclusion that Pabst had acquired only a life estate was, in my
view, almost certainly wrong. The License for Executors’ Sale and the
deed to Frey were admittedly ambiguous. But the ambiguity should
have been resolved in favor of Pabst, for three reasons. First, the deed
that Marie and Frey executed when they sold their interests to Pabst a
year later was a warranty deed, promising that Marie and Frey jointly
73
had sufficient interests to confer fee-simple title on Pabst. Such a deed
necessarily meant that Marie and Frey were selling both Marie’s interest
74
in the homestead and the remainder interests in the homestead.
Second, Wisconsin law at the time provided that ambiguous grants of
75
land should be construed as conveying “all the estate.” All the estate
here would mean both the life estate and the remainders. Finally,
76
ambiguous deeds are construed against the drafter. Since Marie, as an
executor of her husband’s estate, had signed the deed to Frey, any
ambiguity in that deed should have been construed in favor of the
70. Pabst argued that when Marie renounced the will and elected to take marital
property rights under the law, she nevertheless still inherited the remainders under the will.
The court responded that the statutes called for an election: either one takes under the will or
one renounces the will—it is all or nothing. See 93 Wis. at 145–48, 66 N.W. at 249. Pabst
argued in the alternative that, by assuming the mortgages on the homestead property, he
acquired an equitable title to the remainders. The court rejected this, too, noting that
assumption of the mortgages was part of the original consideration for the conveyance from
Marie to Pabst and Schandein, and was not a voluntary undertaking by Pabst to preserve the
title of the remaindermen. Id. at 148–50, 66 N.W. at 245–47.
71. Id. at 145, 66 N.W. at 246.
72. See Mail Bag Used as Hearse, LIMA NEWS (Lima, Ohio), Dec. 14, 1899 (stating that
“[s]o far as known, for the first time the United States mails have been used as a hearse” and
recounting how the ashes of Marie Melms, widow of C. T. Melms, were returned by mail from
Germany for burial in Milwaukee).
73. Supplemental Transcript of Record, supra note 37, at 341–44 (Exhibit 65: Deed from
Frey and wife and Marie Melms to Pabst and Schandein).
74. A warranty deed is one in which “the grantor assures the grantee that there are no
defects in the title whatsoever . . . .” 14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6,
§ 81A.03[1][b][ii]. Wisconsin decisions from the period of Melms frequently employ the term
in this sense. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Koch, 35 Wis. 618, 620 (1874); Hooe v. Chi., Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry. Co., 98 Wis. 302, 302−03, 73 N.W. 787, 787 (1898).
75. WIS. STAT. ch. 103, § 2278 (1878) (providing “[e]very devise of land . . . shall be
construed to convey all the estate”).
76. 14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 81A.05[3][b][i]; see, e.g., Lintner v.
Office Supply Co., 196 Wis. 36, 42−43, 219 N.W. 420, 422 (1928).
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grantee, Frey, meaning that he received the remainders. For multiple
reasons, then, the instruments should have been construed to mean that
the estate sold the children’s remainders to Frey, who in turn sold them
to Pabst.
Did the estate have the authority to sell the children’s remainders?
Almost certainly it did. These were vested remainders, not contingent
remainders, and vested remainders have always been regarded as being
77
alienable inter vivos. When Marie rejected the will, electing to take a
life estate in the homestead, the remainders in the homestead were
inherited by the children, who were minors. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in the Pfister case decided in 1884, had specifically held that
Marie, as an executor of the estate and legal guardian of the children,
78
was competent to act on their behalf.
Thus, the estate had the
authority to sell the children’s remainders in the homestead, just as it
had authority to sell all the other interests that the children had
79
inherited by intestate succession from their father.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s erroneous ruling that Pabst had
only a life estate in the homestead nevertheless gave the Melms children
their third and final shot at securing some satisfaction from the Pabst
Company. If Pabst had only a life estate, then Pabst had a legal duty not
to commit waste to the injury of the remaindermen, i.e., the Melms
children. Accordingly, the children sued Pabst yet again, this time for
committing voluntary waste by demolishing the mansion on the
80
homestead property in 1891–1892. Under Wisconsin law at the time, a
81
The
party who committed waste was liable for double damages.
children sought to show that the mansion had a substantial value, and
that they were entitled to recover not only possession of the one-quarter
acre of homestead land once their mother died, but also two times the
82
cost of restoring the mansion as it had been before its destruction.

77. 3 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 23.06 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2001).
78. Melms v. Pfister, 59 Wis. 186, 189–91, 18 N.W. 255, 259 (1884) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 52–55 supra).
79. A potential complication here is that the eldest Melms son may have reached the age
of majority (twenty-one) by the time the estate sold the property to Frey. But it does not
appear that this was ever asserted by the children as a ground for overturning the sale to Frey.
80. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899).
81. Id. at 7, 79 N.W. at 738 (citing WIS. STAT. § 3176 (1898)).
82. See Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 17–26 (testimony).
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It is not unlikely that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, when it heard
the third Melms lawsuit in 1899, realized that it had made an error in
holding that the Melms children had remainders in the homestead
property. At the very least, it must have realized that it would be highly
inequitable to penalize Pabst for acting as though he owned the mansion
outright when he had every reason to believe, based on the
representations of the parties from whom he had purchased the
property, that he owned the mansion outright. The right thing to have
done—the candid, forthright, courageous thing to have done—would
have been to overturn the decision about title to the homestead, or at
least to absolve Pabst from liability based on a good-faith error. But,
perhaps to avoid an embarrassing reversal, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court did not do the right thing. Instead, it fudged the facts, and, in so
doing, transformed the law of waste.
III.
When the Melms children’s waste action went to trial, the opposing
sides presented very different views of the waste issue. The children’s
theory was that they were entitled to inherit a specific thing—the
mansion built by their father. In order to make them whole, Pabst was
required to pay an amount that would permit the mansion to be
reconstructed. The children therefore submitted testimony designed to
show the cost of rebuilding the mansion. They offered witnesses who
testified to the high quality of the materials: marble floors, carved
83
banisters, a large dance room—even indoor plumbing and steam heat.
84
An architect testified it would cost at least $25,000 to rebuild; C. T.
Melms’s youngest brother, who was in the fire insurance business,
85
testified that that it would cost $25,000; a building contractor testified
86
that it would cost “about $20,000.”
Pabst presented a very different view of the matter. In his view, the
critical question was the market value of the mansion. The children, he
conceded, were entitled to the land on their mother’s death, but they
should not be awarded damages for waste if the presence of the mansion
added nothing to the value of the land. Pabst’s witnesses therefore
testified that the mansion, if it still stood, would have little or no rental

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 17–18 (testimony of Gustav Melms).
Id. at 19 (testimony of Charles A. Gombert).
Id. at 22 (testimony of Leopold Melms).
Id. at 24–25 (testimony of George B. Posson).
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value and would not be attractive to purchasers at any price. Some
witnesses said that the elevation of the structure high above the street
87
meant that there were too many steps to climb. Others testified that
the dominant use of property on the north side of Virginia Street had
changed from residential to manufacturing, and that the highest and
88
best use of the land would be as a factory site. The picture they
painted was of a forlorn house perched on a high knoll, surrounded by
industrial property. The circuit court ruled that Pabst had not
89
committed waste.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. Justice
Winslow, perhaps as penance for his decision in the homestead case, was
again given the honors of writing the opinion. He made a valiant effort
to appear to preserve continuity with the past. There was nothing
wrong with traditional definitions of waste, he wrote, including
Wisconsin precedent holding that “any material change in the nature
and character of the buildings made by the tenant is waste, although the
90
value of the property should be enhanced by the alteration.” The basic
91
Nevertheless, it was
concepts should remain “much the same.”
important to recognize that application of these concepts was
necessarily subject to “reasonable modifications as may be demanded by
92
the growth of civilization and varying conditions.”
Thus, although the Wisconsin court had previously held that it was
waste for a tenant to cut a hole in the roof of a boarding house to install
93
a chimney, the present case involved “radically different” elements.
What was so radically different about Pabst’s destruction of the Melms
mansion? Simply put, the neighborhood had changed. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court painted a picture of inexorable socioeconomic change
sweeping the south side of Milwaukee:

87. Id. at 27–28 (testimony of D.G. Rogers); see also id. at 39 (testimony of A.L.
Worden); id. at 40–41 (testimony of R.C. Reinertsen).
88. Id. at 32 (testimony of Fred Vogel, Jr.); id. at 34 (testimony of C.W. Milbrath); id. at
37 (testimony of Emil Durr); id. at 44 (testimony of George Bensenberg).
89. Id. at 12–14 (findings and judgment); Melms, 104 Wis. at 9, 79 N.W. at 738.
90. Melms, 104 Wis. at 10, 79 N.W. at 739 (quoting Brock v. Dole, 66 Wis. 142, 28 N.W.
334 (Wis. 1886)).
91. Id. at 11, 79 N.W. at 739.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 13, 79 N.W. at 740.
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The evidence shows that the property became valueless
for the purpose of residence property as the result of the
growth and development of a great city. Business and
manufacturing interests advanced and surrounded the
once elegant mansion, until it stood isolated and alone,
standing upon just enough ground to support it, and
surrounded by factories and railway tracks, absolutely
undesirable as a residence and incapable of any use as
business property. Here was a complete change of
conditions, not produced by the tenant, but resulting
94
from causes which none could control.
Under the circumstances, the court indicated, no reasonable person in
Pabst’s position could ignore the new conditions in the neighborhood.
The court reinforced its emphasis on changed circumstances by
noting a variety of agricultural analogies. If an orchard was rendered
permanently unproductive by disease or death of the trees, would the
95
tenant be prohibited from turning the land into a vegetable garden? If
the market for grain collapsed, would a wheat farmer be prohibited
96
from planting the fields with tobacco? The most dramatic analogy was
to a North Carolina case, which had considered whether it was waste for
a life tenant, after the Civil War, to allow quarters for former slaves to
97
fall into disrepair.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court thought it was
entirely proper to hold in those circumstances that the duty of the tenant
was not to preserve the slave quarters intact, but to act as “a prudent
owner of the fee” would have acted in the face of the dramatic change
brought on by emancipation—in other words, to let the slave quarters
98
deteriorate.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 14, 79 N.W. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 14–15, 79 N.W. at 740–41 (citing Sherrill v. Connor, 12 S.E. 588 (N.C. 1890)).
Id. at 15, 79 N.W. at 741.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court said that its decision was not to be
construed as justifying a tenant in making substantial changes in order
“to suit his own whim or convenience” or because the changes would be
99
“in some degree beneficial.” But the Melms mansion had “no practical
value, and would not rent for enough to pay the taxes and insurance
thereon”; if converted to “business property, it would again be useful,
100
and its value would be largely enhanced.” The court concluded that
when “there has occurred a complete and permanent change of
surrounding conditions, which has deprived the property of its value and
usefulness as previously used,” the question whether the tenant “has
been guilty of waste in making changes necessary to make the property
101
useful” was a question of fact, to be decided by the trier of fact.
It would be an overstatement to say that Melms unequivocally
repudiated the understanding of property as the right to specific things,
and substituted in its place an understanding of property as a storehouse
of wealth measured by market prices. After all, the court insisted that,
ordinarily, a tenant is obliged to return the thing in a substantially
102
unchanged condition when the tenancy ends.
But by creating an
exception for changed circumstances, the court moved a long way
toward embracing the understanding of property as economic value.
The court asked rhetorically at one point, “Must the tenant stand by and
preserve the useless dwelling-house, so that he may at some future time
103
turn it over to the reversioner, equally useless?”
The statement
implies, at least when market values change significantly, that the duty
to preserve the identity of the thing is trumped by considerations of
economic value.
IV.
The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Melms rests on one
of the oldest tricks in the appellate court playbook: changing the facts to
fit the desired result. The Melms mansion was affected by changed
circumstances before it was demolished, but the changes were not the
product of urban growth or socioeconomic changes to the

99. Id.
100. Id. at 8–9, 79 N.W. at 738.
101. Id. at 15–16, 79 N.W. at 741.
102. Id. at 10, 79 N.W. at 739.
103. Id. at 13, 79 N.W. at 740.
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neighborhood. The changes were due to the actions taken by Pabst
104
himself.
When Pabst and Schandein purchased the property, the mansion and
the beer garden were an integral part of a valuable and fully functioning
brewery operation. The mansion would be occupied by the brewmaster
and his family, who would oversee the operations of the brewery, the
malt house, the bottling plant, and the other associated facilities. The
beer garden on the terrace, in common with other breweries operated
by German families in Milwaukee in the nineteenth century, served as
an important marketing tool in selling beer. The house and beer garden
stood on an elevation facing a dense residential neighborhood and
beckoned to thirsty customers on warm evenings. Photographs from the
era show that other brewery operations had beer gardens on elevated
terraces and brewmaster houses that were somewhat similarly located in
105
relation to the brewing operations.
The first action taken by Pabst that undermined the economic value
of the mansion was the decision to open a new bottling plant in 1881,
106
just to the west of the mansion.
This required cutting down a large
portion of the terrace that served as a beer garden. Several years later,
Pabst closed the South Side Brewery and consolidated his operations in
the Empire Brewery on the north side. Considering only access to
transportation, this was a questionable decision. The South Side
Brewery had an enviable location, abutting both water and a rail line.
These facilities provided the South Side Brewery with ready access to
the two principal modes of commercial transport at the time. The
Empire Brewery, which was landlocked, had neither advantage, and
thus incurred the additional expense of having its barrels hauled to a
train station or docking facility.
It is possible that changing
demographics had something to do with the decision. The south side

104. The witnesses for Pabst in the circuit court were well aware of these facts, and
carefully avoided any claim that the circumstances facing the Melms mansion in the early
1890s were attributable to anything other than Pabst’s own actions. See Transcript of Record,
supra note 33, at 26–61 (testimony).
105. See, e.g., The Milwaukee of a Half Century Ago: A City of Foaming Beer and Good
Music, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 16, 1932, at 1, available at http://www.wisconsinhistory.
org/wlhba/articleView.asp?pg=8&id=11277&key=Immigrant&cy= (last visited April 13, 2011)
(containing an illustration of Schlitz Park which displays a structure elevated on a hill). The
elevation may have been to provide for underground storage and natural refrigeration for the
brewing operation.
106. Zimmermann, supra note 30, at 1. The building, which still stands, bears the date
“1881” on the cornice.
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107

was rapidly being populated with Polish immigrants, and Pabst may
have regarded the north side, which was more heavily German, as a
more congenial location. The critical point is that the decision by Pabst
to close the South Side Brewery was not forced on him by economic
necessity but was a voluntary decision of uncertain motivation.
Closing the South Side Brewery set in motion a series of actions that
led to the destruction of the mansion. Once the brewing operations
were eliminated, it no longer made sense to keep a beer garden and
brewmaster’s house on the property. Sure enough, without a brewery to
supervise, Schandein moved away, leaving the house vacant. The
remaining terrace on which the beer garden stood was soon cut away,
leaving “an isolated lot and building, standing from twenty to thirty feet
108
above the level of the street.”
Critically, it was this point in time—
when the house stood empty on an isolated knoll—that the Pabst
witnesses used as their point of reference in commenting on the market
109
value of the mansion.
But the fact that the mansion had muchdiminished market value because of its physical isolation and lack of a
tenant was entirely due to decisions made by Captain Pabst.
What then about the neighborhood? The Wisconsin Supreme Court
suggested that the neighborhood had been transformed from residential
110
to industrial, and hence was no longer a fit place for a family to live.
But a careful review of the testimony offered by the Pabst witnesses
reveals that no one claimed the neighborhood in general was no longer
residential. Maps from the era show that the south side of Virginia
Street, directly opposite the mansion, remained fully residential, as did
much of the area farther to the south and east of the property. To the
south of Virginia Street, the area was, and indeed today still is (one
short block farther south), completely residential. These matters can be
seen in Figures 6 and 7 on the following page.

107. JOHN GURDA, THE MAKING OF MILWAUKEE 172−73 (3d ed. 2008).
108. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 8, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899).
109. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 38–41 (testimony of Worden,
Reinertsen).
110. Melms, 104 Wis. at 8, 79 N.W. at 738 (the mansion became “wholly undesirable” as
a residential property).
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Figure 6. This map, primarily taken from Rascher’s Fire Insurance Atlas of
the City of Milwaukee (1876 as updated 1885) and combined with the 1888
Rascher’s, depicts the Melms mansion and vicinity at the time of the 1891–
1892 teardown. Note the neighborhood of houses on the other side of
Virginia St. and continuing south toward Park St. (and farther south
beyond the margin of this excerpted image). Courtesy of the Milwaukee
Public Library.

Figure 7. This modern aerial view (© Google) shows the site today. Note
the houses on Bruce St. (formerly Park St.) and continuing to the south.
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There is a broader lesson in this mischaracterization of the facts. If
demolishing the mansion was ameliorative waste, then the tenant
himself created the condition that he was ameliorating. This suggests a
serious complication in using economic value as a measuring stick for
determining waste. What is the temporal baseline against which one
measures changes in economic value? In the Melms case, if the baseline
is 1870, when the South Side Brewery was a fully functioning operation,
tearing down the mansion would have reduced the market value of the
property. If the baseline is 1890, when Captain Pabst had closed the
brewery and excavated around the mansion, then tearing down the
mansion presumably enhanced the market value of the property. By
picking 1890 (or so) rather than 1870 as the baseline, the Wisconsin
111
courts made it much easier to let Captain Pabst off the hook.
V.
These ruminations about the Melms case are designed to explain a
fundamental shift in the law of waste. This is not the shift usually
discussed in the literature. Starting with Morton Horwitz’s work,
American scholarship has focused on the early nineteenth century as a
time when the law of waste took a decisive turn away from English law,
112
allegedly in the direction of a more flexible pro-development doctrine.
Whether any such turn occurred at that time is doubtful. Some of the
113
cases discussed by Horwitz in fact reaffirmed the English view. In any
event, the cases cited in support of the supposed break with English law
all involved issues of agricultural cultivation, especially clearing trees for
planting. It is not clear that there was any real difference between

111. There was still the matter of the quarter acre of land on which the mansion sat,
which was included in the Melms homestead rights. Pabst succeeded in acquiring the
remainder interest of one of the seven children, and brought an action in partition against the
other six children, hoping to force a judicial sale and acquire the remaining rights. In its fifth
reported decision involving the Melms children, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to
grant partition, on the ground that Pabst held the entire life estate and hence there was no
“divided possession” between Pabst and the children. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Melms, 105 Wis.
441, 443, 81 N.W. 882, 882 (1900). Although Marie had died the previous year—which meant
that Pabst and the children did have divided possession—apparently no one apprised the
Wisconsin Supreme Court of this fact.
112. See HORWITZ, supra note 3. PURDY, supra note 3, and Sprankling, supra note 3,
appear largely to accept this characterization.
113. See HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 54–55 (discussing Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns 227
(N.Y. 1810), which applied English waste law). Horwitz relies primarily on statements made
by the dissent. See id. at 55. PURDY, supra note 3, at 50–53, also vests great significance in
the Jackson v. Brownson dissent.
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114

English and American law on this point. If there were differences in
the results reached, they are easily explained by differences in the facts
on the ground: the English cases involved an established agrarian
society and American cases an agrarian society in the process of being
created out of a wilderness. There is no reason to believe that the
English courts, if they had had jurisdiction, would have decided the
cases about clearing forests to plant crops any differently than the
American courts did.
The real transformation in the American law of waste occurred not
in the nineteenth century, but in the twentieth. That transformation was
not a manifestation of inexorable social and economic change. Rather,
it was a top-down reform influenced by the Legal Realist movement.
Two decisions framed the argument for reforming the law of waste.
One was Melms. The other was a New York decision, Brokaw v.
115
Fairchild.
The two decisions involved striking similarities in their
116
facts, but very different outcomes.
At the center of both cases were large stately mansions constructed
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In each, a life tenant wanted
to tear down the mansion and replace it with a more economically
117
valuable use: industrial property in the case of the Melms mansion, a
118
high-rise apartment in the case of the Brokaw mansion.
In each,
persons with interests in remainders following the life estate objected to
the destruction. In Melms, the heirs of the Melms estate sought double
damages under Wisconsin law after the life tenant demolished the
119
mansion. In Brokaw, nieces and nephews who had a small chance of
inheriting the property sought an injunction to prevent the life tenant
120
from tearing down the mansion.

114. Melms itself cited two English equity cases, noting that “even in England” a change
in agricultural uses by a tenant “will not be enjoined in equity when it clearly appears that the
change will be, in effect, a meliorating change which rather improves the inheritance than
injures it.” Melms, 104 Wis. at 11, 79 N.W. at 739 (citing Doherty v. Allman, (1878) 3 App.
Cas. 709 (H.L), and In re McIntosh, (1891) 61 L.J.Q.B. 164).
115. 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff’d mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 402 (App. Div.
1930), aff’d mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931).
116. The Restatement of Property gives two illustrations of ameliorative waste, one based
on the facts of Melms and the other based on the facts of Brokaw. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROPERTY § 140 cmt. f (1936).
117. Melms, 104 Wis. at 13, 15–16, 79 N.W. at 740, 741.
118. Brokaw, 237 N.Y.S. at 14.
119. Melms, 104 Wis. at 7, 79 N.W. at 738.
120. Brokaw, 237 N.Y.S. at 12.
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The orthodox view of the two cases, as it emerged in the 1930s, is
121
roughly as follows. Melms was correctly decided.
The Melms court
recognized that a rigid and unbending view of ameliorative waste is
undesirable. Courts should not always insist on preservation of the
property, but should take into account a variety of factors, such as
changed circumstances of the neighborhood and relative economic
values, before deciding whether ameliorative waste should be
condemned. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in deciding that the Pabst
Brewing Company had not committed waste, was therefore correct to
eschew any rigid rule against fundamental transformation of the
property.
122
Brokaw (the orthodox view continues) was wrongly decided. Isaac
Brokaw, a wealthy New Yorker, built a complex of mansions on Fifth
123
Avenue between 79th and 80th streets. He left each of his children a
mansion, to be held by them for life, and then inherited by their
children; only if his children left no children was the property to be
inherited by his other children’s children, that is, the nieces and nephews
124
of the life tenant.
After Isaac’s death in 1913, the preferred use of
land on Fifth Avenue changed, with mansions coming down and
apartment buildings going up. Isaac’s son George, who had the mansion
at the corner of 79th Street and Fifth Avenue, found living in the old
mansion oppressive. It was large and drafty, and expensive to maintain.
George tried to rent it out, but found no takers. He proposed
demolishing the mansion and building a thirteen-story apartment
125
building.
When some of his nieces and nephews objected, the New
126
York courts agreed that demolition of the mansion would be waste.

121. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 140 cmt. f (1936) (using the facts of Melms
as an illustration and indicating that the case was decided correctly).
122. Id. (using the facts of Brokaw as an illustration and indicating that the case was
decided incorrectly).
123. Brokaw, 237 N.Y.S. at 9–10.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id. at 10–11.
126. Id. at 14.
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Figure 8. The Isaac Brokaw Mansion, 5th Avenue and 79th Street, New York City.
Undated. The mansion was razed in 1965 in favor of a 25-story apartment building.
Courtesy of the Museum of the City of New York. The Underhill Collection. B.1642.

The Brokaw decision was widely condemned by leading law
professors of the day, especially those influenced by the Realist
127
movement. It was decried as rigid and unreasonable, an impediment
128
to progress. A blue-ribbon panel of law reformers, the New York Law
Revision Commission, recommended that the decision be overturned by
129
the New York legislature. The commission’s idea of a sound approach
130
to the law was the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Melms. The
commission proposed a five-part test for determining whether an action
is waste, including whether the area has experienced changed
circumstances and whether the modification would enhance the value of

127. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 13, at 97–98 (describing Brokaw as “notorious” and
“unfortunate”).
128. See id. at 98–99 (describing reaction of New York legislature to remove effect of
case by creating a more flexible rule).
129. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 60(G), 158th Sess. 7, 45 (1935).
130. See id. at 51–52.
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131

the property. The New York legislature adopted the proposed law in
132
1937, and it remains in effect today.
The New York reform proved to be highly influential with bodies
such as the American Law Institute, which also adopted a test consistent
133
with Melms for inclusion in the Restatement of Property. Eventually, a
majority of states adopted the Melms approach, looking to multiple
factors including changed circumstances and economic value in deciding
whether voluntary transformation of property should be regarded as
134
waste. Only a minority—about ten states—continue today to adhere
to the Brokaw approach, which condemns as waste any material
135
alteration of the property.
At bottom, Melms and Brokaw embody conflicting views of the
basic purpose of the law of property. Brokaw views property as an
individual right. Isaac Brokaw had a right to specify that his
grandchildren would inherit the mansions he built. This is different
from the right to say that they would inherit either the mansions or
something else having equal or greater monetary value, such as an
apartment house. Melms is understood to embody the view of property
as a social institution. The ultimate question is, what was the highest
and best use of land? Is the site better suited for a mansion or a factory?
If the correct answer is a site for a factory, then the law should facilitate
the efforts of individuals to reach the correct answer, without regard to
what particular individuals with possibly idiosyncratic views might think.

131. See id. at 60–61.
132. See 1937 N.Y. Laws 618, 618–19; N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 803 (McKinney
2009).
133. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 138–145 (1936). Richard Powell, the
Reporter for the Restatement, described the Melms decision as “eminently sound.” 9 A.L.I.
PROC. 78, 123 (1930–1931).
134. See Lovett, supra note 3, at 1212–16.
135. Gina Cora, Want Not, Waste Not: Contracting Around the Law of Ameliorative
Waste 11 (Apr. 1, 2009) (Yale Law School Student Scholarship: Student Prize Papers: Paper
47), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsspps_papers/47. The article also notes that nine
states and the District of Columbia have no law on the subject. Id. at 1. As Judge Posner
points out in his comment, the property casebook I authored with Henry Smith describes the
Melms approach as a “minority” view. Richard A. Posner, Comment on Merrill on the Law of
Waste, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1095, 1096 n.4 (2011) (citing THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E.
SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 604 (2007)) [hereinafter Comment]. We
wrote without the benefit of Ms. Cora’s fifty-state survey, see Cora, supra, which shows that
some kind of multifactor or economic-value approach is now the majority view and that the
common-law test applied in Brokaw has become the minority view. The statement in the
casebook will be revised in the next edition.
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Melms is the catalytic decision that began the process of remaking the
136
doctrine in this fashion.
This is why I said at the outset that Melms may be the most
important U.S. decision on the subject of waste. It served as the model
for what the modern approach to waste should look like, and led,
directly or indirectly, to a reformation in the doctrine that now prevails
in a majority of American jurisdictions. Before Melms, a Brokaw-like
understanding prevailed, whereby the tenant was required to return the
137
property to the absent owner without material alteration.
After
Melms, the understanding has increasingly become that the tenant is
required to return something of equal (or greater) economic value to
whatever it was the absent owner gave up.
VI.
The ultimate question, of course, is whether this was a change for the
better. To help answer that question, we need to consider how the
doctrine of waste actually functions in the modern world.
It turns out that it functions silently, and mostly in the background.
The reason for this is that the issues governed by the law of waste are
138
today largely handled by contract. The law of waste has always been
understood to be subject to modification by contract. At common law,
if a conveyance was made “without impeachment for waste,” this meant
the tenant was free to make modifications to the property that otherwise
139
might be chargeable as waste.
Over time, contractual provisions
concerning the treatment of property by tenants have become
140
ubiquitous, to the point where the action for waste is rarely invoked.
136. Although Melms used economic value as only one factor to be considered in
determining whether a tenant has committed waste, economic value will be strongly
correlated with other factors the court cited, such as changed circumstances and reasonable
use. Thus, it was not too great a distance from Melms to regarding loss of economic value as
the defining characteristic of waste. Indeed, Wisconsin has moved in this direction. See
Manor Enter., Inc. v. Vivid, Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 382, 401–02, 596 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Ct. App.
1999) (stating that an action for waste lies only when the tenant has caused “a substantial
diminution in the value of the estate”).
137. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (regarding “material alteration”).
138. See PURDY, supra note 3, at 665.
139. 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 56.02.
140. The evidence for this is inferential rather than direct. Judge Posner cites an
electronic search revealing 255 “waste cases” in the last ten years. Posner, Comment, supra
note 135, at 1099 n.9. But without further details, it is difficult to know how many of these
cases involved a seriously contested waste claim. The most comprehensive treatment of
waste in a modern treatise is STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 2, which devotes five
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The reason for this is probably that the costs of contracting have
steadily fallen, first through the widespread use of standard-form
contracts, more recently through the use of easily copied digital files. As
contracting has become cheaper, contractual solutions have increasingly
squeezed out the solution imposed by the law of waste.
Consider landlord-tenant relations. The law of waste provides an
important background principle for landlord-tenant relations. But
today, nearly every leasehold longer than a month-to-month tenancy is
141
governed by a written lease. And nearly every written lease will spell
out, in some fashion, the respective duties of the landlord and tenant in
terms of maintaining the property, as well as the tenant’s obligation to
obtain the landlord’s permission before undertaking any significant
142
modification of the property.
When disputes arise over the tenant’s
failure to maintain the property, or over the tenant’s attempts to change
the property, these disputes are nearly always resolved in terms of these
143
lease provisions, not in terms of the law of waste.
Similarly, take family wealth settlements. Again, if someone wants
to divide family property over two or more generations, the law of waste
provides an important background principle in describing the respective
duties of the present and future generations. But today, if specific assets
are conveyed to one person for life and then to one or more
remaindermen after that person dies, this is nearly always done by
144
creating a trust. The trust instrument will spell out what powers the
trustee has to sell, mortgage, or modify specific assets held in trust.
When a dispute arises over whether to turn the family mansion into a
bed-and-breakfast, it will be resolved by the trustee, subject to review
sections to the subject. See id. §§ 4.1–4.5. For the last two decades covered by their treatise
(1980–2000), they cite twenty-eight appellate decisions from twenty-one states. In other
words, appellate decisions worth citing are being produced at a rate of only slightly more than
one per year, and there are no notable opinions in over half of the states during this period.
Of course, appellate opinions are but a small fraction of cases filed in trial courts.
Nevertheless, the treatise data suggest to me that relatively few waste claims are advanced in
court, and that the vast majority of disputes between landlords and tenants, or between life
beneficiaries and remaindermen, are today resolved by contract.
141. 2 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN & PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR., FRIEDMAN ON LEASES
§ 22:2.1, at 22–10 (Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2004).
142. See id. § 22:7, at 22–28 (describing how parties intending to change the premises
during a lease ought to include within the lease specific agreements and outlines of plans).
143. Id. § 22:2.1, at 22–10 (“Current leases invariably make some reference to alterations
or improvements of the leased premises, and it is the interpretation and construction of these
stipulations that govern the rights and duties of today’s tenants.”).
144. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 553 (8th ed. 2009)
(noting that conveying a life estate outside a trust is today “rare and almost always unwise”).
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for compliance with the trust instrument and general trustee duties, not
145
under the law of waste.
Importantly, nearly every dispute over the tenant’s treatment of
property presents not one but two potential opportunities to resolve the
issue by contract. The issue can be resolved ex ante, by drafting
appropriate provisions in the lease or the trust. But if the issue is
overlooked, or the parties are not happy with the resolution that has
been adopted ex ante, then there will be another opportunity to
negotiate a contractual solution ex post. Ex post, the transaction costs
of contracting will be higher, given that the parties are locked into a
relationship with each other—a bilateral monopoly—and this can lead
146
to extensive strategic maneuvering or even to bargaining breakdown.
Nevertheless, contractual modifications of duties toward specific
property can be and often are modified ex post. Landlords and tenants
do renegotiate leases, and beneficiaries do persuade trustees to modify
their management of property under trust. These negotiations provide a
second opportunity for a contractual solution, if for some reason the
parties are dissatisfied with the first contractual solution.
Because the law of waste has been largely superseded by contract,
the question about what form the law of waste should take can be seen
as a question about the best default rule—that is, the best gap filler to
147
apply when the contract is silent. If we view the doctrine as a type of
contract default rule, what is the best version of the law of waste?
Given that nearly all disputes between tenants and absent owners
are today resolved by contract, a simple, intuitive rule that is easy to
apply without expert input may be the best default. The reason is
straightforward: such a rule will reduce the cost of contracting. Let us
assume that the parties to a potential waste dispute both understand the
outcome that would maximize their joint welfare. Taking the Melms
dispute as an example, let us say the optimal outcome is to tear down
the mansion and level the ground as an industrial site. In order to agree
contractually on this outcome, however, the parties must agree on which
party must make concessions to the other and in what amount. Must the
life tenant (Pabst) make a side payment to the remaindermen (the
Melms children) in order to obtain their permission to make the
145. See POSNER, supra note 3, § 3.11.
146. See id.
147. There is a large literature on contract default rules. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract
Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389 (1993).
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change? Or can the life tenant proceed without the permission of the
remaindermen, and perhaps even demand a contribution from them as a
condition of making the change (for eliminating the cost to them of
future demolition)? If the default rule is uncertain or requires extensive
investigation, then it will be more difficult for the parties to reach an
agreement on these issues. A simple, intuitive, self-applying rule, in
contrast, is likely to make the baseline of entitlement clear to both
parties, and hence will facilitate the process of reaching a contractual
solution that prescribes the optimal outcome.
The commentary on the law of waste, in contrast, tends to assume
that the rule should be designed not to reduce the costs of contracting,
but to allow courts to reach the right outcome in litigated disputes. This
would be the correct perspective if most or even a significant number of
such disputes were resolved through litigation. But I have suggested
that this is not in fact the case. The law of waste functions as a default
rule or baseline for contracting, not as a decisional rule applied by
courts—at least not very often.
Given their court-centered perspective, the commentators argue in
effect that courts should adopt, as a default rule, the rule that the parties
would have adopted for themselves if they had thought about the
problem. This will presumably leave them better off than any other
rule, and the objective of contracting is to enhance the joint welfare of
the contracting parties.
One prominent suggestion along these lines, urged by John Henry
Merryman, a Stanford law professor who wrote the chapter on waste for
148
the American Law of Property, would ask the following in each
individual case: what would these particular parties have agreed upon
had they thought about the matter, based on their individual wants and
desires? In effect, the question in every case should be one of intention:
did the tenant’s actions contravene or frustrate the intentions of the
parties? All the circumstances of the parties should be considered in
answering this question. If no signposts of intention can be uncovered,
then the parties should be presumed to have intended that the tenant
149
would engage in reasonable conduct, in light of all the facts.
Another approach, which also adopts a court-centered perspective,
asks instead, what would persons in general have agreed upon in these
circumstances? This is the approach urged by Judge Richard Posner in

148. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, at v.
149. Merryman, supra note 13, § 20.11.

MELMS 13AUG11.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1088

8/13/2011 11:02 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
150

[94:1055

his Economic Analysis of Law. Judge Posner observes that the tenant
and the owner have different time horizons. The tenant will generally
want to maximize the return to the property during the time the tenant
is in possession; the absent owner will want to maximize the return
151
during the time after the tenancy ends.
Posner argues that the best
approach is to maximize the value of the property over both periods.
This yields the largest net value, which the parties can divide among
152
themselves as they wish. This is also the approach, Posner says, that
an economically rational owner who holds an undivided interest in the
153
The appropriate default rule for judging the
property would adopt.
actions of the tenant is thus whether the tenant has acted in the way an
economically rational owner of an undivided interest in the property
154
would have acted. Here we see the idea that the proper measure of
property is social value, measured by market prices, adopted explicitly.
Neither approach, it seems to me, is likely to be optimal if it turns
out that nearly all disputes between tenants and absent owners are
resolved by contract. The most basic difficulty is that both approaches
are relatively expensive, because they make waste turn on something
that is invisible. The parties’ intentions are not readily visible to the
naked eye, nor is the market value of the property. I am not saying that
these things are not real. But they cannot be observed by ordinary
people. They require investigation and expertise.
This means, in turn, that using either parties’ intentions or economic
value as a criterion for identifying waste will be relatively expensive.
Merryman’s intent test will often require a complicated inquiry into
legal documents and personal circumstances that cannot be discerned by
looking at the land. An investigation into the circumstances of the
parties may be required, as well as consultation with legal experts about
the proper interpretation of the terms in leases, wills, and trusts.
Posner’s economic-value approach is also expensive. Experts will have
to testify about different uses of property and different market values
for different uses.
Legal standards that require extensive fact-finding and expert advice
are not always bad things. But in this context, they are misplaced.
Given that disputes about tenant conduct are today overwhelmingly

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

POSNER, supra note 3, § 3.11.
See Merryman, supra note 13, § 20.11.
POSNER, supra note 3, § 3.11.
Id.
Id.
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resolved by contract, the default rule should be one that makes it easiest
to contract. Specifically, the rule should be one that ordinary
individuals can discern and apply without having to resort to legal
investigation or a real-estate appraiser. Such a rule will make it much
easier for the parties to understand whether they want to deviate from
the default rule, and what the contract must say if they want a different
155
result.
Another problem associated with both the Merryman and the
Posner solutions is that there will likely be considerable uncertainty
about their proper application. Under Merryman’s approach, it is not
always clear whose intention counts. In a landlord-tenant relationship,
is it just the landlord’s intention, or is it also the tenant’s? If the
landlord assigns the reversion to another landlord, which landlord’s
intent counts? If the tenant assigns the lease to another tenant, which
tenant’s intent counts? In the life-estate context, do only intentions of
the grantor count? What if a life estate is created by legal election, as in
the case of the Melms estate? The root of the problem is that temporal
divisions of property are not simple variations on conventional bilateral
contracts. Property rights can be transferred and divided in a variety of
ways, and it is far from clear that there is some unique set of intentions
156
that attach to every decision to divide title over time.
Posner’s economic-value test suffers from a different uncertainty in
application, related to picking the appropriate baseline for comparing
two different states of the world. Posner’s discussion presupposes that
each parcel of property will have a unique value-maximizing use, and
that the rational owner will always adopt this use. But there will often
be uncertainties about the proper unit of time or the proper physical
unit for applying the economic-value test. For example, persons often
acquire property intending to hold it for future expansion or
development. This may entail holding it in a suboptimal use for a
significant time until the development can take place. Likewise, persons
may hold multiple parcels of property, which fit together in a general
scheme or plan, even though individual parcels are deployed in ways
that are suboptimal from a market perspective. These uncertainties
155. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 14 (1985) (arguing that courts in low-transaction-cost settings
should adopt rules that minimize “entitlement-determination costs”).
156. Here as elsewhere in property law there is a mixture of contractual and property
elements, and the intentions of the parties are often channeled into a fixed menu of property
forms. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001).
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generate even greater need for expert input and undoubtedly magnify
the expense associated with the use of the test.
If disagreements about modifications of property by tenants were
nearly always resolved by litigation, then I would agree that either
Merryman’s intent test or Posner’s economic-value rule might be
warranted. Such rules would be more uncertain and expensive to
administer. But they would allow courts to reach judgments that would
produce more satisfactory outcomes, from either an individual or a
157
social-welfare perspective.
The extreme infrequency of modern cases applying the doctrine of
waste, however, strongly suggests that contractual solutions are the
norm, not litigation. Given the ubiquity of contractual solutions to the
problem, the default rule should be designed to induce the parties to
address the issue by contract. Jed Purdy, in writing about this issue, has
used the phrase “bargain-inducing default rule,” which seems to me to
158
capture the idea nicely.
VII.
If the intention test and the economic-value test are too expensive
because they require expert input and are uncertain in application, then
does the traditional common-law rule—forbidding material alterations
in the premises—function better as a default rule in a context where
contractual solutions are the norm? The answer, I think, is “Yes.”
The critical facts under the traditional rule are the condition and use
of the property when title is first divided, and the condition and use of
the property when the tenant’s custodial practices are challenged.
These facts are visible to the naked eye. To determine these facts, one
does not have to consult lawyers schooled in the interpretation of legal
documents, or real-estate appraisers adept at assessing the market value
of property. One need only examine the property itself or—in the event
the property has been modified—consult architectural drawings,
photographs, or evidence about its condition when title was divided.

157. See id. at 852 (arguing that courts in high-transaction-cost settings should adopt
rules that permit discretionary judgments maximizing the wealth of the parties).
158. PURDY, supra note 3, at 665. Purdy apparently understands by this term what Alan
Schwartz called an “equilibrium-inducing default.” Schwartz states as follows: “[A]n
equilibrium-inducing default rule induces parties to choose the welfare-maximizing term.
Parties respond to an equilibrium-inducing default either by accepting it or by contracting to
another term. The default is correctly designed if parties accept it when it directs the efficient
outcome, and contract to an efficient term otherwise.” Schwartz, supra note 147, at 390.
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We do not need to take elaborate evidence about what the parties
intended when they divided the property; what most owners would have
done with the property under the circumstances; what the economic
value of the property was before and after the tenant modified it;
whether the neighborhood has changed and, if so, whether the source of
the change was independent of the tenant’s actions; and so on and so
forth.
Given these features, the traditional common-law rule should
function well as a bargain-inducing default rule. It is simple, intuitive,
159
and self-applying.
It sends a clear signal to the parties about their
respective rights and obligations. If the parties want a different rule,
they will know that they must contract for a different rule. The
traditional rule will thus facilitate contractual solutions, and it will do so
160
both ex ante and ex post.
The traditional rule also avoids knotty questions about application
that arise under either the Merryman intent rule or the Posner
economic-value approach. The condition and use of the property when
the property is first divided set the baseline against which future tenant
behavior is measured. If the tenant materially changes the condition,
the tenant has committed waste; otherwise not. The condition of the
property when title is divided is a physical fact that exists with respect to
every parcel of property whose title is divided. The condition when the
dispute erupts is also a physical fact that exists with respect to every
159. New York courts have enforced lease terms requiring the consent of the landlord to
any alteration in the premises even in the face of plausible arguments that the tenant’s
modifications have enhanced the value of the property. See Gabin v. Goldstein, 497 N.Y.S.2d
984, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Freehold Investments v. Richstone, 340 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (Sup. Ct.),
rev’d, 346 N.Y.S.2d 718 (App. Div. 1973), rev’d, 311 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1974). In support of
this outcome, these courts, interestingly, have cited the common-law rule that any material
alteration in the premises is waste, even if the value of the property is enhanced by the
alteration, Gabin, 497 N.Y.S.2d, at 987; Freehold Investments, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 364—without
noting that the common-law rule has been overturned in New York by statute. See supra
notes 127–32 and accompanying text. This suggests that the “no material alteration”
conception of waste has an intuitive pull that endures even in the face of the Legal Realist
campaign to substitute a standard of value maximization.
160. The matter is complicated by the fact that a clear but one-sided default rule can
interfere with bargaining, especially under conditions of bilateral monopoly. See Robert
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23–24 (1982) (noting that strategic behavior
may cause bargaining to break down). But the clarity of the default rule does not always
eliminate ex post bargaining. If the tenant wants to make a modification that will enhance the
value of the property, this will generate new wealth which can be divided between the parties
as part of the bargaining over whether to permit the change. A clear default rule may mean
that the tenant will have to share some of the gains with the absent owner. But this does not
mean that the change will not occur.
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parcel whose title is divided. There are thus no conundrums about
application, analogous to whose intent we consult under the Merryman
test or what unit we use for valuation under the Posner approach.
Admittedly, the qualifier “material” in the common-law rule injects
a bit of wiggle room. What it means, I think, is that the rule is to be
161
applied with a view to normal owner behavior. In other words, given
the condition of the property at the time the title is divided, what actions
would a normal owner take in maintaining the property in this
condition? We do not ask whether a normal owner would change the
condition of the property. We just ask what a normal owner would do
in order to preserve the condition unchanged.
Let me offer an illustration. Some of the early common-law judges
and commentators got tied up in knots trying to specify when a tenant is
162
allowed to cut down trees. They said that cutting down trees to profit
from the timber was waste, whereas cutting down trees for necessary
163
repairs to the estate or for fuel was not waste; and so forth. A better
understanding would be that courts should look to what constitutes
normal behavior. If an agricultural tenant would normally cut some
trees to repair fences and for firewood, then this would not be a material
alteration. If an agricultural tenant would not normally cut trees for
commercial sale, then it would be a material alteration. Most of the
early cases about trees are consistent with this general understanding,
whatever verbal formulations they may have adopted.
VIII.
There is still more to be said in support of the traditional commonlaw rule. One can think of all sorts of clear rules that might serve as
bargain-inducing default rules. “The tenant can do whatever he wants,”
would be one such a rule. “The tenant must do whatever the absent
owner says,” would be another. What we need is not just a bright-line
default rule, but a rule that harmonizes with broader understandings
161. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 731–32 (1973) (employing normal use, as
measured by “contemporary community standards,” as a baseline in nuisance law).
162. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *281–82; 1 EDWARD COKE, THE
FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON
LITTLETON § 67 (53.a–.b) (18th ed. 1823).
163. See, e.g., Anon Y.B. 44 Edw. III, f. 44, pl. 58 (1370) (establishing an exception to
waste for necessary repairs to the estate). For early American cases holding that a tenant has
the right to cut firewood, see Padelford v. Padelford, 7 Pick. 152 (Mass. 1828); Webster v.
Webster, 33 N.H. 18, 66 Am. Dec. 705 (1856).
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about the value and function of property as an institution in our society.
The traditional common-law rule, in prohibiting the tenant from
making any material alteration in the property, broadly comports with
the understanding that the purpose of the institution of property is to
protect the subjective expectations particular owners have in particular
things. When possession is temporarily transferred, the owner is
entitled to expect that what comes back is the same thing the owner had
when possession was transferred. Not something else of equivalent
value. The thing itself. The traditional rule is the kind of rule that we
would expect to be adopted by a legal system that conceives of property
as an individual right, not simply a social arrangement for maximizing
wealth.
Wait a moment, you may object: if title is divided, then there are at
least two people who have some stake in the thing—the absent owner
and the tenant. The common-law rule protects the autonomy of the
absent owner about her thing, but it does so by disregarding the
interests of the tenant regarding the thing. Why adopt a rule that
protects one party at the expense of the other? Why not balance their
interests, or adopt some kind of approach that tries to reach an
accommodation by giving weight to both interests?
Part of the answer is that we are dealing here with probabilities. The
law of waste makes the judgment that the absent owner is more likely to
have a strong subjective attachment to property than is the tenant
temporarily in possession. This is just a generalization. For leases and
life estates of relatively short duration, the generalization almost always
holds true. The absent owner—the landlord or the remainderman—will
have a stronger attachment to the property and a stronger claim to
control its configuration and use.
In other circumstances, the
generalization will not hold true. A tenant under a ninety-nine-year
lease will have much stronger subjective expectations about the
property than the landlord holding the reversion. Note, however, that
the exceptional cases are precisely those in which we would most expect
to find a contract giving the tenant discretion to modify the use of the
property. Any lawyer for a tenant under a very long-term lease would
be guilty of malpractice if she did not attend carefully to the issue of
tenant modifications. The common law, by giving the right to control to
the absent owner, reaches the right result in the largest number of cases,
and allows the smaller number of cases where this does not work to be
handled by contract.
Another and more fundamental part of the answer is that we cannot
balance interests between tenant and absent owner without abandoning
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the idea of property as an individual right. If property is a right of
particular persons to protect their subjective expectations about things,
then property must confer sovereign-like powers on those we regard as
owners. This includes the power to give possession of your property to
others and expect to get it back. Maybe in other contexts, like pollution
control and eminent domain, we have no choice but to switch to the idea
of property as a balance of competing interests, or a social institution
with outcomes measured by market values. But in the relatively simple
bilateral disputes governed by waste doctrine, there is no need to
introduce these complexities.
In short, waste is one area where we do not have to choose between
the traditional understanding of property as an individual right and the
rival conception of property as an institution for maximizing social
value. We can retain the understanding of property as an individual
right, and rely on the institution of contract to protect the societal
interest in deploying resources to the greatest social advantage. There
would seem to be little reason to abandon the idea of property as a
source of protection for individual autonomy absent a strong
justification for doing so. No such justification exists here.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Melms started us down the path
toward a law of waste characterized by utilitarian balancing and
economic valuations of competing uses of land. There was no need to
do so. Captain Pabst should have been absolved of liability based on his
good-faith mistake about title to the mansion. The law of waste should
have been left unchanged. Had it remained unchanged, it is possible
that it would remain unchanged today.

